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ABSTRACT
Currently, the world system is in a state of complex crisis and transfor-
mation. The overall influence of its US-led centre has weakened, and 
most of the global periphery is in either chaos or misery. The mecha-
nisms of the global accumulation of capital prevent new global leaders 
from emerging. Until now, China’s economic ascent has been based on 
managed market forces and sovereign monetary policy. However, if the 
liberalisation of capital flows in China continues, the country’s financial 
independence might be lost. This article explains how the nodal crisis 
of global capitalism has evolved, how far the marketisation and financial 
liberalisation of the Chinese economy has gone and the largest obsta-
cles to China further strengthening its influence on the world order. The 
author concludes that China could play a positive role as a new super-
power in constructing a world beyond capitalism, if it does not give up 
the socialist project, keeps market forces under control, maintains accu-
mulation without dispossession, preserves its financial independence 
and makes alliances with other nations on the global (semi-)periphery. 
The latter is particularly important, as the present hegemonic centre 
will not give up its position peacefully.
Introduction
Today’s capitalism is dominated by transnational corporations as well as national and inter-
national institutions and the specific rules that serve their interests. Rozsnyai (2002) calls this 
stage of capitalism transnational monopoly capitalism, while Amin (2015) uses the expression 
generalised monopoly capitalism. This world order has been in a complex, structural crisis for 
decades. At the turn of the millennium, the soft landing of the US economy (the leader of 
the centre of the system) and the following credit-based economic growth reflected the end 
of a long cycle of capitalist reproduction, known as the Kondratieff wave. The technological 
paradigm (information technologies) of this long cycle has been exhausted and the related 
global institutional structures and rules (neoliberalism) have become obsolete. Such nodal 
crises are persistent and can be solved only by a qualitative leap. The latter can be either an 
internal jump, which means a reform of the system, or a systemic change, which means the 
replacement of the existing system by a totally different one (see Artner 2018). The nodal 
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crisis of transnational monopoly capitalism is also the crisis of the world order which it has 
constructed.
The outcome of this situation depends on the availability of a counter-power to the present 
imperialist ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000), which can offer an alternative socio-economic 
organisation to the world. Hardt and Negri (2000, 2019) argued that no single nation-state 
can form the centre of the global world order. Samir Amin (2015) emphasised that it is the 
‘Triad’ (the alliance of the United States, the European Union and Japan) and the associated 
institutions of global capitalism, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc., that rule the world. This imperialist empire can be 
overcome only by ‘the multitude of exploited and subjugated producers’, whose ‘creative 
forces’ are able to form ‘a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows 
and exchanges’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 394, xv). For the same reason, Amin worked for the 
formation of an international alliance of people (eg the World Social Forum), and called for 
the establishment of the Fifth International (Amin 2018b).
Today, a new horizon is showing itself. In the foreseeable future, Asia, with the leadership 
of China, could play the role of a new centre – or at least a co-centre – in a ‘new global 
power structure’. The questions are: first, whether China can become a real global power 
against the imperialist Triad and, second, whether China will offer a qualitatively new, more 
equitable and sustainable social system. The answers depend mostly on the fate of the 
socialist project within China.
History has shown that the change of societies and empires always starts from the periph-
eries. Large and strong systems can be overturned only in their declining phase, and only 
by equally large and strong powers. Reaching this strength is not possible within the frame-
work of the cemented hierarchy of the existing system. The logic of global capital accumu-
lation limits the possibility of catching up within the framework of contemporary capitalism. 
Therefore, China, like any other nation, could become an epoch-changing power if does not 
assimilate into this logic, but rather maintains its financial independence and limits its market 
forces and the accumulation of private capital. Additionally, the transformation to an alter-
native global order presupposes the cooperation of the leader of this transformation with 
those nations which also necessarily must decouple themselves from the exploitative mech-
anism of transnational capitalism.
Based on the above premise, the article examines how and why China has risen to its 
present position and the prospects of its further ascent in the role of a non-US-type hegemon 
or fourth power of the Triad. For this discussion, the nature and crisis of the capitalist world 
system and the reality of catching up within its framework and under its rules are brought 
under scrutiny. This is followed by a discussion of the evolution, characteristics and effects 
of Chinese reforms in the last few decades. The later sections are devoted to the importance 
of financial independence in general, China’s efforts to keep its finances under control and, 
finally, the obstacles to the rise of China as a new hegemon.
The crisis of the world system
The decline of the present world system has made the emergence of new powers on the 
global chessboard possible. Therefore, we begin with a description of this decline.
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Neoliberalism, the amalgamation of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, was 
born as a result of the crisis of the 1970s in order to facilitate the restructuring of production 
with free movement, accumulation and concentration of capital. These measures helped 
transfer the burdens of the crisis from the centre to the peripheries by relocating obsolete 
technologies to low-wage countries, selling the outdated products there and using the 
profits deriving from these activities to further the technological advancement in the centre 
countries.
The debt crisis of the developing countries in the 1980s, and the way it was managed by 
the IMF and World Bank, helped neoliberalism spread, opening the markets of the developing 
countries (the global periphery) and plugging them into the expanding value chains of 
transnational capital. This reorganisation of capital accumulation coincided with the decon-
struction of welfare states and the suppression of the working-class protests in the developed 
countries (the global centre). In this critical moment, as the 1980s came to a dramatic end 
when the ‘existing socialism’ in Eastern Europe collapsed, ushering in the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, global capitalism suddenly appeared blessed. 
The failure of the historical socialist experiment not only seemed to justify ‘TINA’ – the slogan 
formulated by Margaret Thatcher in defence of the neoconservative turn in 1979, meaning 
‘there is no alternative’ – but also considerably enhanced the opportunities of the transna-
tional capital. Competing states, free markets, natural resources, means of production and 
hundreds of millions of educated but inexpensive workers suddenly became available for 
the ‘profit-making machine’ of the centre capital.
At the same time, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States 
remained the only superpower on the geopolitical map. Capitalism was triumphant in its 
economic, political and ideological aspects, and the world lay unprotected from the global 
imperialist activity of the US-led Triad. The collapse of the socialist bloc, together with the 
gradual, partial opening of China’s market to foreign investors beginning in 1979, released 
the tectonic power of ‘predatory neoliberalism’. ‘[A]s long as the Soviet contender bloc 
held out, it worked to rein in the destabilising primacy of money-dealing capital and the 
predatory neoliberalism it has spawned’. (Van der Pijl 2019, 3). In the following decade, 
the political elite of the US ‘were preoccupied with, in effect, creating a de facto global 
empire, even though they clothed the goal under the rubric of “spreading democracy and 
the free market”. The Pentagon termed that Pax Americana “Full Spectrum dominance”’ 
(Engdahl 2016, 43).
In short, the systemic change in Eastern Europe saved capitalism, still struggling with 
structural crisis, by facilitating its change of form to transnational (generalised) monopoly 
capitalism and allowing its predatory character to be unleashed. Since then, the transnational 
corporations have grown enormous. Through their value chains, they systematically drain the 
national labour (surplus value) of the ex-socialist and developing countries and accumulate 
wealth and power at the expense of the working class of both the periphery and the centre.
However, after the additional resources of Eastern Europe were eaten up, and the profit- 
generating potential of the new information technologies in the centre exhausted, new 
crises began around the turn of the Millennium: the 1998 East Asian financial crisis, which 
affected numerous emerging economies in Asia (including China), and later the ‘soft landing’ 
of the US economy in 2001 and 2002. Unlike in the 1970s, this time the real nature and 
magnitude of the crisis remained hidden due to the predatory nature of neoliberalism. By 
that time, the liberalisation and deregulation had reached the financial sector in all centre 
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Figure 1. The global hierarchy of capitalism.
abbreviations: CoC: the Centre of the Centre (“the Core”); eu10: the 10 most developed countries of the 
european union; PiiGS: Portugal, ireland, italy, Greece, Spain; Cee11: 11 Central and eastern european 
member states of the european union (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech rep., estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, 
Poland, romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); BriCS: Brazil, russia, india, China, South-africa; iC: internal 
Centre – the elite; iP: internal Periphery/semi-periphery – smaller capitals, wage laborers, the poor etc.
Source: author’s own construction.
countries and the Eurozone had also begun functioning. These allowed the practice of cred-
iting to boom while governments encouraged lending to feed economic growth. The finan-
cial deepening was accompanied by the growth of speculative investments and the 
integration of the ex-socialist Eastern Europe into the European Union. These developments 
culminated in a financially backed pseudo growth (Artner 2018).
By that time, due to the value chains of the transnational companies and the international 
regulations and agreements (accession to the EU, Eurozone, free trade agreements like North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), etc.), some (semi-)peripheries had become more 
closely integrated into the centre and therefore Artner (2018) referred to them as the ‘inte-
grated (semi-)periphery’. This is shown in Figure 1, which also distinguishes the most influ-
ential centre countries (US, UK and Germany) as ‘the centre of the centre’ (or ‘the global 
core’), as well as categorising the inner centres (the elites) and inner peripheries (weaker 
social strata) within each country-group and each country. We see that, over time, the global 
structure has become more rigid, but its extension, which is the lifeblood of capital, has 
become more difficult as the huge market and resources of China have not been freely 
available for capital accumulation. The special status of China is symbolised by a circle, which 
belongs partly to the unintegrated and partly to the integrated semi-periphery but also, to 
some extent, remains outside the global capitalist hierarchy.
Relying on Figure 1, we can proceed with the explanation of the nodal crisis of the capi-
talist world system.
The financially backed pseudo growth of the 2000s not only masked the crisis of the real 
(non-financial) sphere of the economy and postponed its outbreak but also helped transfer 
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its burdens. However, unlike the 1970s and 1980s, when the burdens were pushed out of 
the centre to the global peripheries, in the 2000s the deep deregulation of the financial and 
capital markets made it much easier for the centre capital to yield profits from the invest-
ments on the integrated and inner peripheries and semi-peripheries (Artner 2018).
The crisis accumulated in the inner (semi-) peripheries and appeared in the form of real 
estate and other asset price bubbles causing the growing indebtedness of the business and 
household sectors. The transference of burdens happened as follows: the crisis was managed 
through bank bailouts, and fiscal stimuli were applied to parallel the declining tax revenues 
caused by the falling gross domestic product (GdP). This pushed up public debt, which led 
to austerity policies – and austerity measures always hit primarily the working class and 
smaller companies, ie the inner (semi-) peripheries. Taken together, these caused a sharp 
fall in demand and considerably deteriorated the prospects for recovery, a problem that 
was most severe in the integrated European semi-peripheries (PIIGS).  In this way, the crisis 
‘got stuck’ in the centre, especially in the more developed parts of Europe, causing an unusu-
ally slow recovery after the 2008–2009 recession. The global cycle of capitalist reproduction 
as well as the innovation in the centre had slowed down. Overall, the recovery was slower 
than after previous recessions. To regain business confidence, the state needed to intervene 
to help the centre in the form of monetary ‘quantitative easing’. China’s fiscal stimulus also 
helped its trading partners to recover. We may conclude that the centre capital was unable 
to launch a new robust global cycle on its own, as the ‘predatory neoliberalism’ had weak-
ened the centre and shaken its global dominance.
The US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), which provides analyses for the leaders of 
the Army and the department of defense, describes an erosion of the US military advantage 
and the formulation of a ‘volatile and uncertain restructuring of international security affairs 
in ways that appear to be increasingly hostile to unchallenged US leadership’. It calls this 
new epoch of the international order ‘post–US primacy’ (Freier 2017, xv). The report always 
mentions China first among the countries that are considered ‘threats’ to the US (the others 
are Russia, North Korea and Iran).
In summary: the protracted crisis of the North Atlantic centre represents the crisis of the 
present world order. Based on his historical knowledge, Amin (1976) emphasised that in the 
case of the decline of an empire, basic systemic changes and emerging powers have always 
started from the periphery. Today, that means that any emerging entity that wants to catch 
up and change the world has to gain or preserve its independence from the global hierarchy 
of capital accumulation. As this relates to China’s position and ongoing steps to liberalise 
finance and land management, we must have a closer look at this problem.
Reality of catching up within the framework of  
the global capital accumulation
Catching up is usually measured as the level of per capita GdP, and this measure shows that 
the GdP per capita of a given underdeveloped country grows persistently faster than the 
GdP per capita of a more developed one; for this reason, the former can reach the latter’s 
level of development. Although GdP is not an adequate indicator to measure the level of 
‘development’ in a broad sense, we can agree that a higher GdP per capita means greater 
ability to accumulate wealth and everything that can be associated with it: technology, 
knowledge, military power, etc.
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There were fast-growing catching-up periods in many countries in the last few decades, 
but most of them proved to be temporary or exceptional.
One current example is Ireland, the Celtic Tiger, whose success is due to the local activity 
of transnational corporations, as the Irish domestic economy is weak. This is reflected in the 
outstanding gap between its gross national product (GNP) and GdP, the latter being higher 
by a staggering 25–30%.
Other frequently cited examples of catching up are the Four Southeast Asian Tigers (Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan). These have produced fast growth rates since the 
1970s and increased their GdP per capita to the level of the developed countries, or close 
to it. However, these economies also have unique characteristics. They are either financial 
or infrastructural hubs, as seen in Singapore and Hong Kong, or have special geopolitical 
importance, like Taiwan and South Korea. Furthermore, their trajectories have been based 
on massive state intervention before the neoliberal age, external financial help and advan-
tageous geographical locations (which is in connection with their special role in the global 
market). despite the advantages these countries enjoyed, the catching-up process of Taiwan 
and South Korea slowed down markedly in the 2000s. Only Singapore and Hong Kong were 
able to reach the level of the US in GdP per capita terms, according to Maddison (2018).
In other cases, such as in Eastern Europe after the systemic change, the periods of catching 
up usually had a very limited duration and ended before reaching the level of the centre 
countries (Artner 2018). This phenomenon is called the ‘middle-income trap’ (Im and 
Rosenblatt 2013; Sőreg 2017), although it would be more appropriately identified as the 
illusion or impossibility of catching up within the existing framework of transnational (gen-
eralised) monopoly capitalism.
Arrighi (1990) and Mies (1993) presented empirical examples of this illusion from the time 
period right after capitalism gained dominance over the world due to the fall of the socialist 
alternative in Eastern Europe. Even earlier, donella Meadows pointed out that heavily 
indebted developing countries (the ‘South’) had financed the rich centre (the ‘North’) in the 
1980s. Meadows (1989) stated that 85 billion dollars per year on average flowed from the 
South to the North in the 1980s. Other calculations, based on data of the World Bank and 
United Nations Conference on Trade and development (UNCTAd), found that between 1983 
and 1992 the developing countries had enriched the global centre with a yearly net of 49 
billion US dollars on average, even after taking into consideration both the flows on debts 
and foreign direct investments going from the North to the South (Artner 2014, 103–104). 
The illusion or impossibility of catching up has been reinforced by the experiences of the 
European integrated periphery and semi-periphery (see Figure 1), ie Southern and Eastern 
Europe (Artner 2018).
Although the explanations for the failure of catching up are various, ranging from inap-
propriate economic policy, such as forced export orientation or dependence on foreign 
investments, to the concept of historically inherited underdevelopment – the most decisive 
factor is obviously the mode and level of embeddedness into the system of global capital 
reproduction and financial flows. The latter determines the direction of net flow of value, 
which eventually leads to drainage of the human and natural resources of the periphery. 
For this, Samir Amin was convinced that getting rid of these exploitative effects of global 
capital, which he termed ‘delinking’, is the precondition for escaping from the trap of under-
development. delinking does not mean autarky. Rather, it means ‘refusal to bow to the 
dominant logic of the world capitalist system; the second option is one of inevitably passive 
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adaptation (even if it is called “active insertion”) to the demands of integration into the 
global system’ (Amin 2006, 27–28). delinking is more feasible if the concerned nations form 
alliances and share their resources within the framework of international cooperation.
This delinking is necessary in order to stop the pilfering of national labour and facilitate 
the accumulation and advancement of the national production forces. Additionally, as Amin 
(1990) explained, embeddedness into the global system of capital deforms the domestic 
economic structures, as well as the technological development, and thereby limits the effi-
ciency and competitiveness of the developing countries. Foreign companies are frequently 
enclaves with no meaningful developmental effect on their host countries, while the enforce-
ment of the ‘export orientation’ policy, one of the neoliberal dogmas, usually leads to the 
expansion of the labour-intensive sectors, which are, allegedly, ‘comparative advantages’ of 
the developing countries due to their low wage levels. All these processes contribute to the 
fixation of the economically inferior status of the developing countries within the global hier-
archy and prevent them from catching up in a meaningful way. Consequently, the pursuit 
of catching up within the framework of transnational monopoly capitalism is vain and 
disadvantageous.
The question is, then, what specific characteristics helped China to produce a successful 
catching-up process, and what are the conditions of maintaining this in order to lift China 
from its special semi-periphery status within the global capitalism (see Figure 1) to the 
position of epoch-changing leader? The next sections address these issues.
Implementing ‘Deng’s cat theory’
Just at the time when neoliberalism had spread throughout the world, China gradually let 
the genie of market forces out of the bottle. In 1978, deng Xiaoping initiated policy changes 
to speed up accumulation and domestic investments and to foster economic, technological 
and infrastructural development. The rationale behind the reforms has become known as 
‘deng’s cat theory’. However, it is not a real theory. It refers to deng’s infamous explanation 
of the economic policy turn, which prioritised practice over theoretical considerations; to 
wit: ‘It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice’. Using 
this logic, political practice eventually overtook theory and, the immediate and material 
goals jumped to the forefront of Chinese politics; the realisation of the socialist society was 
postponed until the unspecified future – as reflected in the amendments to the Chinese 
constitution.
The first amendment to the Chinese constitution in 1988 gave a green light to the 
private sector in the economy, declaring, ‘The State protects the lawful rights and interests 
of the private sector’. This amendment also liberalised the use of land, allowing it to ‘be 
transferred according to law’. The second amendment in 1993 introduced the expression 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, and changed the primacy of economic planning 
to the so called ‘economic rules’ of a ‘socialist market economy’. The third amendment in 
1999 declared that the ‘deng Xiaoping Theory’ was to be the third source of guidance, 
coming after Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, on the socialist road of China. 
This amendment stated that ‘diverse sectors of the economy’ and ‘the coexistence of a 
variety of modes of distribution’ are parts of the ‘primary stage of socialism’, in which China 
will remain ‘for a long period of time’, and that ‘individual, private and other non- 
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public economies’ are ‘major components of the socialist market economy’. The fourth 
amendment in 2004 went even further to declare that the state not only protects but also 
‘encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public’ – ie individual and 
private – ‘sectors of the economy’. This amendment also allowed the accumulation of 
private wealth, as it postulated that ‘private property is inviolable’ and the state protects 
‘the rights of citizens to private property and its inheritance’ (Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China 2018).
In the meantime, foreign investments and international trade had been gradually liber-
alised. After 2002, China began to invest its accumulated private and public capital abroad, 
and in 2007 established its first major sovereign wealth fund (China Investment Corporation), 
with 200 billion USd (Artner 2010a). The resulting fast growth of the Chinese outgoing 
foreign investments limited the global playing field of the centre capital to a certain extent.
The whole world watched these developments in China with bated breath. For the 
centre countries, China’s fast economic growth and huge export activity, rapid techno-
logical development, increasing investments abroad and successful fight against poverty 
had been most astonishing and, at the same time, most annoying. The reason behind 
the anxiety was that competitiveness of Chinese producers and, hence, China’s potential 
to catch up to the centre have greatly improved. How the US-led centre now tries to 
prevent the continuation of this process will be discussed later. Others have said that 
the market-type reforms threaten the project of socialism and open the doors to capitalism 
in China.
Therefore, the next section seeks an answer to the question: Will deng’s reforms, if con-
tinued, lead to socialism, or back to the road of capitalism?
A long road to socialism or a detour to capitalism?
deng’s reforms, adapted and managed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), have unde-
niable merits as measured by the achievements of the country in the last few decades. 
However, it is good to remember that similar marketisation processes took place in Eastern 
Europe from the 1960s with the leadership of Hungary. These reforms were also led by 
communist parties and began with debates over the role of commodity production and 
individual interests in socialism, but led eventually to the deconstruction of the socialist 
institutions and morals and concluded in the regional restoration and global strengthening 
of capitalism.
The interests of the individual can be – and historically have been – successful driving 
forces in economic development. However, in our era of globalised production forces, indi-
vidual interests are insufficient and must be replaced with a common, global management 
of the world. despite this, individual interests still prevail and cause more harm than good, 
as evident in the largely unresolved problems of social, economic and ecological 
‘sustainability’.
Therefore, marketisation has become an obscure and dangerous alternative for socio-eco-
nomic development, particularly in the case of such a huge and populous country as China. 
The question is how far the marketisation of the Chinese economy can go without becoming 
irreversible. If China finally becomes a capitalist country led by the fierce competition of 
individual interests, and aspires to the role of a superpower similar to the US, what then 
could save mankind from a third world war?
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The accumulation of capital continues, and the role of the private sector is growing in 
the Chinese economy. Between 1980 and 1999, private investments grew from 3.7% to 17% 
of the Chinese GdP (Greeven 2007, 98). This figure represented about one-half of all invest-
ments; by now, the share has grown to about 70%. By the middle of the 2000s, private capital 
contributed 55–63% to the GdP (Artner 2010b). Presently, it comprises about 60% of the 
GdP, 90% of all exports and new jobs, 80% of urban employment and 70% of innovation 
(Guluzade 2019).
The ambiguity of this developmental path is reflected in the heated debate over the 
nature of Chinese society. Paraphrasing the expression ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ 
(introduced by the 1993 amendment of the Chinese Constitution), david Harvey (2005) 
called the reforms ‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’. Other authors refer to China 
as a ‘globaliser dragon’ (Magalhães 2018), a ‘responsible reformer’ (Weissmann 2015) or an 
‘illiberal’ state (Vukovich 2015), or as practicing ‘state capitalism’ (Amin 2013; Brenner 2019).
Joel Andreas believes that from the time of the 1990s, in China ‘the non-capitalist market 
economy that existed in the 1980s had been transformed into a capitalist economy’, where 
‘virtually all enterprises […] operate according to capitalist principles’. The reforms are ‘likely 
to open the way for massive dispossession of village households’, and Chinese capitalism 
is ‘more efficient and more brutal than most’ (Andreas 2008, 133–134, 142). Similarly, Hart-
Landsberg (2011) holds that the reforms have increased China’s dependence on the capi-
talist world economy and led to the restoration of capitalism and exploitation. Hsu (2015) 
mentions the chauvinistic treatment of ethnic minorities, the failure of local policies to 
develop their regions properly, and the exploitation of natural resources. She considers 
that the Chinese model neither offers a new development alternative nor challenges neo-
liberalism. In their extended work, Coase and Wang describe how ‘China became capitalist 
while it was trying to modernize socialism’ (Coase and Wang 2012, 154), although they 
admit that ‘the series of events that led China to become capitalist was not programmed 
and […] the final result was entirely unexpected’ (Coase and Wang 2012, x).
Others find the picture more complicated and the results less disappointing. yuezhi Zhao 
discusses the ‘unfinished struggle for socialism in China’ by juxtaposing two models of 
development. The ‘Guangdong Model’ represents a free market approach with export ori-
entation and increasing social inequalities. The ‘Chongqing Model’ led by Bo Xilai (‘Red 
Princeling’, the son of a revolutionary leader, and the Communist Party Secretary of 
Chongqing between 2007 and 2012, later imprisoned for bribery and corruption) was an 
attempt ‘to revitalise socialist ideas and populist claims in its push for rapid and balanced 
growth’. Zhao also claims that ‘[a]long with staggering social inequality, the collapse of 
basic social morality and the prevalence of excessive materialistic values have been the 
widely noted cultural consequences of deng’s reforms’, while ‘the post-Mao CCP has not 
stopped championing socialism in rhetoric […] However, in the absence of a coordinated 
socio-economic development model that resembles anything like building a socialist 
society, such campaigns not only sound hollow, but also breed cynicism’. The phrase and 
idea of ‘people’s democracy’, the leading role of the working class and ‘the alliance of workers 
and peasants’ have ‘virtually been forgotten in a reform era that champions the creation of 
the ‘middle class’ (Zhao 2012).
Indeed, the increasing role of market forces resulted in the development of huge income 
inequalities between regions as well as social strata. The Gini coefficient has risen by 15 
1890 A. ARTNER
percentage points since the 1980s, and reached its peak (49.1%) in 2008, although since 
then there has been a slight decline (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018, 4–6). On the other hand, the 
upsurge of income inequalities has gone hand in hand with a massive increase in the real 
incomes of the population. The number of people with no more than 1.9 USd income per 
day has fallen by at least 850 million since the 1970s, and today less than 2% of the popula-
tion lives in extreme poverty (Weiping 2018, XinhuaNet 2018). For the sake of comparison: 
in the US, the bottom half of the society has not gained anything from the growth of GdP 
since the end of the 1970s (Piketty 2014).
The possible reason behind this successful fight against poverty is that the marketisation 
of the Chinese economy is not yet complete. Arrighi (2007) explains this uncompletedness 
by the ‘Smithian features’ of the reforms, meaning gradualism, state policies that expand 
and develop the social division of labour, rapid expansion of education, encouragement of 
competition, subordination of individual capitalist interests to national ones and, more 
importantly, the leading role of the domestic market as well as the improvement of living 
conditions of the rural population. These together are the elements of ‘accumulation without 
dispossession’. Arrighi refers to Joshua Cooper Ramo, who identified two distinctive fea-
tures of the so called ‘Beijing Consensus’ (the alternative to the neoliberal ‘Washington 
Consensus’): ‘localisation’, which means adjusting the way of development to the local needs, 
and ‘multilateralism’, ie the endeavour for interstate cooperation based on economic inter-
dependence and the respect of political and cultural differences (Arrighi 2007, 361, 379).
Aside from these non-capitalist characteristics of China, there is another important issue 
that is relevant to our topic. This is the independence of the Chinese domestic economy 
from the global financial circles, which must be preserved if China wants to avoid its subju-
gation to the centre capital and emerge as an epoch-changing global power in the foresee-
able future. The next section deals with this problematic.
The importance of financial independence
In capitalism, the financial markets form the terrain where the struggle for economic, 
political and military power begins – and this fight may lead towards a military build-up 
and confrontation. Financial markets are neither rational nor competitive and even less 
democratic. They are dominated by a handful of huge transnational corporations (the 
financial oligarchy) that control the production of goods and services, the financial flows 
and the insurance business. In addition, financial markets can easily influence governments 
as well as international organisations like the IMF, the World Bank or the European Union. 
There is a close relationship between financial flows and the geostrategic interests of the 
leading powers: the US, the European Union and Japan, or The Triad, which, according to 
Amin, controls the resources of the globe and implements a ‘collective imperialism’ (Amin 
2018a, 9).
William domhoff, who has been collecting data about the American ruling class since the 
1960s, found that finances have a central importance from the perspective of political and 
economic influence. ‘The predominant power in the United States from 1776 to the present, 
is: Those who have the money – or more specifically, who own income-producing land and 
businesses – have the power’ (domhoff 2014). The true rulers of America are ‘[t]he owners 
and managers of large income-producing properties; that is the owners of corporations, 
banks, other financial institutions, and agri-businesses’ (domhoff 2020).
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The overwhelming influence of the global financial markets explains the Mundell–Fleming 
trilemma, known as the ‘impossible trinity’ of the free movement of capital, fixed exchange 
rates and independent monetary policy. Of these three options, only two can be maintained 
at the same time. The stability of the exchange rate is essential for the predictability of mar-
kets and the encouragement of exports, while the sovereign monetary policy (the possibility 
of lending in local currency) creates the foundations for influencing domestic demand and 
investments. The developmentalist monetary policy presupposes that the central bank is 
not independent from the central government.
The coexistence of a stable (government-controlled) exchange rate and a sovereign mon-
etary policy is feasible only if the capital flow is controlled. It follows that control of the capital 
account makes the developmental state intervention possible and effective. Furthermore, 
by controlling capital flows, publicly owned banks can help new local enterprises to grow 
and build links with foreign companies to facilitate technology transfer and profit sharing – 
as happens in China. Under a completely liberalised capital account, this way of promoting 
domestic development would not be possible.
Based on the Mundell–Fleming model, one may argue that achieving an independent 
monetary policy is still possible if the capital flows are fully liberalised and the government 
abandons the fixed exchange rate. However, from the viewpoint of economic development, 
especially in terms of catching up, flexible exchange rates are very problematic. Since the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, this flexibility has affected the developing countries 
negatively in many ways.
First, the absence of stable exchange rates has caused frequent fluctuations in both 
domestic production and foreign trade, fed speculations and encouraged financialisation, 
which has been fuelled by the flight of capital from the economic sectors where profit expec-
tations are low.
Second, free-floating, fluctuating exchange rates have generated frequent and repeated 
devaluations either because of the speculative attacks that have been stimulated by these 
fluctuations or because governments thought devaluations could remedy the loss of com-
petitiveness by encouraging exportation. The result has usually been the depletion of 
national value due to growing exports, increasing import prices and the higher debt service 
paid on foreign debt. To make matters worse, foreign currency owners could take advantage 
of the devaluations by buying up the national labour and means of production for their own 
production purposes. These mechanisms together result in ‘amplified plunder’ (Amin 2018a, 
9) rather than a generation of growth and catching up.
The control over the financial markets is also crucial because a government is less likely 
to be blackmailed if the national debt – public and private alike – is mostly held by state-
owned banks and denominated in the national currency. This presupposes the use of money 
creation through the domestic central bank, which is, as mentioned, not independent from 
the government.
In the light of these issues, the next section examines how far the liberalisation of China’s 
financial markets has progressed until now.
China’s efforts to keep finances under control
The Chinese government is obviously aware of the unpredictable consequences of uncon-
trolled and fully liberalised capital flows, as its cautious stop–go policy in this field reflects.
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Until 2008, China could match export orientation with import substitution, imposing 
tight control over the capital flows, maintaining a stable renminbi–dollar exchange rate, 
printing money and, due to these factors, minimising dependence on external debt (Brenner 
2019). However, due to the 2008 crisis, the export markets collapsed; China had to change 
its strategy and rely exclusively on money creation by the central bank (People’s Bank of 
China – PBOC). The economic growth had become increasingly dependent on lending that 
excluded the possibility of applying high interest rates. This made the fight against capital 
flight difficult as lowering real interest rates entailed a downward pressure on the renminbi 
and discouraged savings in it. There were major waves of capital flight from China in the 
years following, particularly in 2015–2016 as ‘wealthy citizens rushed their money out of the 
country’. These developments led the government to understand ‘that capital controls con-
stitute its ultimate line of defence in pursuing an independent economic strategy’ and, at 
the same time, to introduce capital-control measures, which were not ‘too draconian’ (Brenner 
2019, 69, 73), because an overly restrictive policy would limit future economic growth. The 
measures mitigated the problem, but could not entirely stop capital flight, which continued 
through other channels, such as foreign trade transactions and citizens taking overseas trips.
In 2017, China took new steps towards financial liberalisation. Foreign banks were allowed 
to operate in China, while the limits on foreign shares in other financial institutions, such as 
asset management companies, insurance companies and securities ventures, had been 
removed, and the virtually fixed exchange rate regime has been abandoned, allowing 
the renminbi to float, although within a narrow margin, and under strict central bank 
management. These are still ‘baby steps’, and the reforms are ‘not really going to be complete 
or clear in the way the global community is demanding’ (Weinland and Lockett 2019), but 
these baby steps somewhat increased China’s exposure to the volatility of global financial 
markets, and did not make the struggle against capital flight easier.
In the first six months of 2019, the total value of hidden capital flight rose to at least 131 
billion USd, or even higher depending on the method of estimation, which is more than in 
the same period in 2015–2016 (Bloomberg 2019).
In summary, until recently China has preserved its independence from the global financial 
sector. The exchange rate of the national currency, the renminbi, has been determined by 
the POBC (controlled by the CCP), and the banks were indigenous and mainly state-owned. 
Thanks to these, China was able to keep market forces under control and use them to encour-
age domestic economic development and improve the well-being of the population. The 
capital controls had been used on a stop-and-go basis, as the leadership of the country tried 
to strike a balance between the needs of market forces and the goal of the indigenous 
development, which was officially aiming towards socialism.
However, China’s latest steps regarding financial liberalisation might change the picture 
as they gave more space for the influence of global financial markets and capital flight. If 
these processes continue in the long run, the confidence in the renminbi could collapse 
(Brenner 2019, 74), which would make both the catching up and the aspiration for a global 
leadership futile.
The uncertainties about the financial independence of China are reflected in the 
contradictory opinions about its true degree. Panitch and Gindin (2013) see similarities 
between the post-war Japanese development and the rise of China in the last few 
decades, stating that both countries have served as financial supporters of US dominance 
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in the world economy (eg both of them have bought US state bonds in large amounts). 
Jefferies (2017) argues against this opinion by highlighting the domestic market-based 
character of the Chinese economic development, the indirect control of the state over 
the private sector, the development of indigenous Chinese technology, and the inde-
pendence from the world financial markets. These factors, Jefferies thinks, predestine 
China to challenge, rather than serve, the US and European leadership in the world 
economy.
However, becoming a global leader has other obstacles as well, which will be discussed 
in the following section.
Obstacles to China’s ascent
China occupied a central role in the world economy before capitalism grew strong in Europe 
and North America. This position was lost during the nineteenth century, mostly as a con-
sequence of the Opium Wars and the subsequent semi-colonial status imposed on the coun-
try by the British Empire. By now, however, China has once again become the largest economy 
in the world, according to its GdP (as measured by purchasing power parity), as well as the 
world’s largest exporter, measured in USd. This breathtaking economic ascent by the country 
and its increased activity on an international scale, such as alliance-building in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America after the outbreak of the 2008 crisis (Engdahl 2015; Weissmann 2015), 
have been accompanied by the decline in the hegemonic strength of the US-led Triad.
This led Arrighi (2007) to the conclusion that China could be the next hegemon of the 
twenty-first century, replacing the United States. He argued that China’s ascent would be 
peaceful, and its global role would be different from the US capitalist–imperialist rule. Arrighi 
explains this by pointing out the East Asian cultural specificities which have determined 
China’s historical path. These characteristics are its labour-intensive agriculture together 
with its common usage of land and peaceful foreign policy, and specifically that throughout 
the centuries China has never built overseas empires nor drained the resources of its periph-
eral regions. Instead, the Chinese government has always been more likely to develop the 
peripheries by investments and integrate them into the empire. Modern China has also 
followed these policies, Arrighi claims, by pursuing peaceful, cooperative geopolitical strat-
egy, avoiding the privatisation of land as well as the extraction of resources from the periph-
eries, and, in general, holding market forces under the control of the state. The huge income 
inequalities have not undermined social stability as they did in Europe, because their increase 
has been accompanied by the decline of poverty and the intensification of social mobility. 
The rising inequality in China is a result of the improvement (and not the deterioration) in 
the position of the middle class (Arrighi 2007, 376).
Two objections can be made here. The first one concerns the ‘Smithian’ concept of the 
‘non-capitalist market economy’, or ‘Smith’s vision of a world-market society based on 
greater equality among the world’s civilizations’ (Arrighi 2007, 8). It is good to remember 
that the idea of a ‘socialist market economy’ proved to be the Trojan horse of capitalist 
production relations in Eastern Europe. It was propaganda used by the ‘reform-communists’ 
to convince the population about a possible ‘third way’ between socialism and capitalism. 
The result was the 1989 systemic change, when the goal of building socialism was entirely 
abandoned, and the region fell to pieces and became the integrated and exploited 
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periphery of the global centre. This experience, together with an increasing accumulation 
of the Chinese private capital and widening inequalities, described above, make the pros-
pects for Chinese society worrisome.
The second objection concerns the possibility of the peaceful rise of China as a new 
hegemon or co-hegemon. The US has never tolerated the smallest sign of an aspiration for 
sovereignty if it jeopardised American interests in any corner of the world. The sanctions 
against Cuba, Russia, Iran or North Korea and the tensions in relations with India or South 
Africa (Tourangbam 2018; Pather 2018) exemplify this, as does the rising hostility against 
China in the last decade. As the trade war has escalated due to the COVId-19 crisis, China’s 
foreign minister, Wang yi, spoke about the risk of a ‘new Cold War’ (Goodley and Sabbagh 2020).
Samir Amin did not believe that the Triad would tolerate China’s rise as a new, fourth 
leading power of the world. It is more likely, he wrote, that they ‘will devote all efforts to 
maintain their exclusive control of the planet’, and resort to the ‘use of all means – “economic” 
and more specifically financial, political and military’ to prevent China from catching up 
(Amin 2018a, 10, 9). Engdahl is of the same opinion:
It is about an all-out assault on China’s strategy to become an advanced, self-reliant economic 
leading economy, technologically on a par with the West, perhaps even more advanced. … The 
United States as the world’s dominant superpower will in no way allow this. Just as the British 
Empire set the stage for World War I to destroy the potential threat of a German superpower, 
now Washington confronts a Chinese economic colossus and weighs its options. (Engdahl 
2018, 1)
This implies that the peaceful catching up of China to the capitalist centre as a co-leader 
is not a real alternative. despite all the obstacles, the Chinese political leadership has not 
given up the intention to build a new type of globalisation. As President Xi Jinping declared 
at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese foreign policy 
maintains the principle of ‘never seeking hegemony’, which does not mean that China should 
refuse international leadership. Instead, China wants to play the role of a ‘non-hegemonic’ 
leader (Zhongying 2018). The manifestation of this doctrine, especially in the light of the 
ongoing financial liberalisation, has yet to be seen, as have the reactions from the present 
‘hegemon’ of the world. Overall, the prospects are far from bright.
The elusive powers that be who control deeper US geopolitical strategy will try with all means 
at their disposal at this point to literally break China with sanctions, humiliation, pressure on 
human rights in Xinjiang, financial warfare and even military threats. As the late Zbigniew 
Brzezinski declared, if USA loses control over Eurasia, the game is over for the sole superpower. 
China must be broken to prevent that. It is a dubious undertaking to put it mildly. War could 
be a consequence, one whose outcome would be catastrophic for mankind. (Engdahl 2018, 1)
Arrighi believed that there was a possibility for China to peacefully change the world, if 
China consolidated its ‘traditions of self-centred market-based development, accumulation 
without dispossession, mobilization of human rather than non-human resources, and gov-
ernment through mass participation in shaping policies’. However, if China fails to follow 
this path, it might fall into social and political chaos, which would open the door either to 
the restoration of the ‘crumbling’ US hegemony or to escalating violence (Arrighi 2007, 389).
In the light of our analysis above, we can mention two additional aspects to Arrighi’s 
conclusion. First, regarding the nature of the Chinese socio-economic organisation, the 
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outcome of the ongoing liberalisation of both finance and land usage is of crucial importance 
from the viewpoint of capital accumulation and inequalities and, hence, the social stability 
of China.
Second, the escalation of violence is, unfortunately, possible even if China remains on 
the ‘non-capitalist’ path. Hegemons have never given up their positions easily, and the US-led 
imperialist Triad is even less likely to do so.
Concluding remarks
The transnational (generalised) monopoly capitalism is in a protracted structural crisis. It is 
also a crisis of the present world order. In this complex or nodal crisis, the entire globalised 
superstructure is affected. The leaders of the contemporary world system (the US-led Triad) 
have become unable to keep the world in ‘order’, which means in line with their interests. 
Most of the African continent, the Middle East and many other countries of the ‘Global South’ 
suffer from poverty, deprivation, upheavals and wars. Millions of people live from hand to 
mouth in refugee camps or wander on international roads hoping for a better life in the 
more affluent countries. On the other hand, the hegemony of the US has declined, Japan 
has lost its dynamism, the image of the European Union as a promising project has decayed, 
and the endeavours of the national capitalists of its Eastern periphery to enforce their own 
interests against the European centre have been intensified. New economic and military 
powers, like China, India, Russia, Turkey, Iran and North Korea, have appeared on the global 
chessboard. The consequences of global warming and the exploitation of the environment 
are still awaiting an efficient response. These phenomena are clear signs of the increasing 
turbulence in our world and the inevitability of its systemic transformation.
Asia, with its fast-growing economies, has undoubtedly surprised the US-led world in 
the last few decades. However, the catching-up process usually exhausts itself after a while. 
The only sovereign that still has the potential to catch up with the US, and challenge its 
leadership in a new world system, is China. The US has been doing its best to prevent such 
an outcome. The rise of China can be obviated either in a ‘peaceful’ way, namely by the 
integration and subordination of China into the global financial system, or by military power. 
The US imperialist circles and their allies are first trying the former, less violent approach.
As long as the law of value (ie profit motive) rules the centre, and its societies suffer from 
increasing social and regional inequalities, catching up with them (ie trying to imitate The 
Triad) should not be the aim of any underdeveloped country. This type of catching up is not 
even possible, because of the logic of global capital accumulation. The real advancement 
of a nation presupposes the detachment (delinking) from the global exploitative mechanisms 
of capital. To achieve this, profound changes are required in the society, to which the con-
temporary nodal crisis offers a possibility. A society beyond capitalism must be based on 
consciously planned management of the forces of production, which cannot be achieved 
without common ownership of the decisive means of production. In our age of climate 
change and global pandemic, which threaten human beings at the time of this writing, the 
urgent need for the common global management of the socio-economic reproduction 
should be apparent even to non-revolutionary thinkers. It should be noted that the 17th 
Sustainable developmental Goal of the United Nations aims at a ’global’ and ’multi-stake-
holder partnership’ (UN 2015, 32). 
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As history proves, every huge systemic change entails the risk of violence and war. 
The interest of the presently ruling hegemonic centre to preserve its position also works 
towards this outcome. A possible solution to prevent the worst is to form regional alli-
ances of nations against the power of the imperialist Triad. These alliances could help 
their members to achieve, first, delinking and then an alternative, non-hegemonic 
globalisation.
China might lead the transformation of this world system towards a better one, if it realises 
the dangers of ‘deng’s cat theory’, which is not a real theory as it puts practice above theory. 
The marketisation has gradually progressed in China over the last four decades, although 
capitalism has not been fully reconstructed in the country yet. However, a massive indige-
nous capitalist class has emerged, which is interested in the continuous accumulation of 
wealth. So, there is a pressure for further deregulation of financial markets, that might lead 
to China’s integration into the global cycles of exploitative capital reproduction. If this hap-
pens, the prospects for a better globalisation that does not build on the anarchic market 
forces would decrease and the likelihood of a new world war would increase. China has all 
the means to become an epoch-changing power if it does not give up the prospect of 
socialism, maintains accumulation without dispossession and cooperates with those nations 
that decouple themselves from the exploitative mechanism of transnational capitalism. The 
colour of the cat does matter.
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